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ABSTRACT
This study examines the challenge of implicit communication -- qualitative statements, tone, and
non-verbal cues -- to the effectiveness of enforcing corporate disclosure regulation. We use a
Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) setting, given that the SEC adopted the regulation
recognizing that managers can convey non-public information privately not just through explicit
quantitative disclosures but also through implicit communication. In a high-profile enforcement
action, however, the court focused on a literal examination of the manager’s language rather than
his positive spin to conclude that the SEC had been “too demanding” in examining the manager’s
statements and that its enforcement policy was “overly aggressive.” We provide empirical
evidence suggesting that selective disclosure from managers to financial analysts increased
significantly after the court’s ruling. We also report survey responses from 60 securities lawyers
with Reg FD expertise which support the proposition that this increase in disclosure is more likely
due to an increase in implicit communication than in explicit communication or any other reason.
Our results highlight the challenges associated with enforcing corporate disclosure regulation in
the context of implicit communication.
For helpful comments, we thank Sudipta Basu, Bill Cready, Rebecca Files, Jere Francis, Jagan Krishnan, Jayanthi
Krishnan, Inder Khurana, Ningzhong Li, Raynolde Pereira, Elaine Mauldin, Suresh Radhakrishnan, Gil Sadka, Amy
Zang, Jieying Zhang, and Yuan Zhang and workshop participants at the University of Texas at Dallas, University of
Missouri – Columbia, Temple University, and HKUST. All errors are our own.
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Implicit Communication and Enforcement of Corporate Disclosure Regulation
“The SEC has scrutinized at an extremely heightened level, every particular word used in the
statement, including the tense of verbs and the general syntax of each sentence…. Such an
approach places an unreasonable burden on a company's management and spokespersons to
become linguistic experts, or otherwise live in fear of violating Regulation FD.” (U.S. District
Court’s Ruling in SEC v. Siebel Systems, Inc.)
1. Introduction
Although disclosure regulation and enforcement focus primarily on explicit quantitative
disclosures, corporations and corporate officials also make extensive use of implicit
communication -- qualitative information, tone, and non-verbal cues. Several recent studies show
that implicit communication can convey significant market-sensitive information (see, e.g.,
Feldman, Govindaraj, Livnat, and Segal 2010; Loughran and McDonald 2011; Mayew and
Venkatachalam 2012a, 2012b; Blankespoor, Hendricks, and Miller 2017). These findings
underscore the importance of examining issues associated with enforcing corporate disclosure
regulations when information is communicated in an implicit manner.
Although these prior studies demonstrated that implicit communication is a component of
corporate officials’ public statements and securities filings, implicit communication is potentially
more significant in the context of private meetings in which there are only a select few market
participants and non-scripted portions are more likely, providing private meeting attendees a better
opportunity to observe not just what is said, but how it is said (Durney 2020; Solomon and Soltes
2015; Soltes 2014). The scope of potential liability exposure that corporate officials face for such
private communication has a critical effect on the effectiveness of corporate disclosure regulations.
Using a unique federal court case as our empirical setting, we examine this issue in the context of
Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD), which prohibits all publicly traded companies from
disclosing material non-public information to a select few investors.
Reg FD provides an appropriate empirical setting for the purpose of our study since, at the
time of the adoption of the regulation, the SEC was firmly of the view that managers could violate
1
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Reg FD not just by what they say but also by how they say it (see, e.g., SEC 1999a, 2000; Fisch
2013). In fact, soon after the adoption of Reg FD in 2000, Richard Walker, Director of the SEC
Division of Enforcement explained the SEC’s position that implicit communication in private
meetings can violate Reg FD, stating “selective disclosure of earnings information cannot come in
the form of indirect guidance, the meaning of which is apparent though implied.” (Walker 2000,
emphasize added). Subsequently the SEC brought two enforcement actions against firms that it
believed selectively disclosed non-public information through implicit communication. 1 In 2002,
the SEC penalized Siebel Systems, Inc. and its CEO for selectively disclosing material non-public
information using positive statements.2 Later in 2003, in an enforcement action against ScheringPlough, the SEC proceeded against the company and its officials for selectively disclosing material
non-public information through “a combination of spoken language, tone, emphasis, and
demeanor.”3 Notably, these early actions were resolved through settlement, so they did not involve
judicial evaluations of the conduct at issue.
The SEC’s approach to addressing selective disclosure made through implicit
communication was challenged, however, when in 2005 the U.S. Federal District Court for the
Southern District of New York dismissed a civil lawsuit brought by the SEC in 2004 against Siebel
Systems, Inc. for violation of Reg FD by its officials. 4 The SEC alleged that the CFO Kenneth
Goldman selectively disclosed material non-public information by using positive statements and
tone in private investor meetings. The SEC noted that prior to the meetings, the company publicly
provided a negative outlook about the company’s business activity, whereas, at the meetings,
Goldman provided an optimistic outlook, which materially contrasted with the negative tone of

1

Consistent with the terminology used in the final release of Reg FD (SEC 2000), we use the term selective disclosure
to refer to communication of non-public material information to a select few.
2
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Siebel Systems, Inc., Litigation Release No. 17860 (Nov. 25, 2002).
3
Schering-Plough Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 48,461, Admin. Proceeding File No. 3-11,249 (Sept. 9, 2003).
4
SEC v. Siebel Sys., Inc., 384 F. Supp. 2d 694 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).

2
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the company’s public disclosures. The attendees promptly purchased the company’s stock, its
trading volume doubled the next day, and its price increased by 8%.5
However, on September 1, 2005, the court held that the SEC had been too demanding. The
court focused on a close reading of the text of the official’s statements rather than the official’s
tone to conclude that his private disclosures were “equivalent in substance to the information
publicly disclosed [by the company].”6 Explaining that “The regulation does not prohibit persons
speaking on behalf of an issuer, from providing mere positive or negative characterizations, or
their optimistic or pessimistic subjective general impressions, based upon or drawn from the
material information available to the public,” the court concluded that Reg FD required a material
difference between the company’s public statements and those made in the private meetings, and
that there was no material difference in the case before it. 7
The court’s ruling in Siebel Systems revealed the difficulty associated with enforcing
corporate disclosure regulations in the context of implicit communication, and created a substantial
burden for enforcing Reg FD for disclosures made in private meetings through characterizations,
tone, or demeanor. The court observed that the SEC’s “approach places an unreasonable burden
on a company's management and spokespersons to become linguistic experts, or otherwise live in
fear of violating Regulation FD.” The ruling also signaled to the market participants that even a
significant stock price reaction or trading activity by select investors following a private meeting
need not constitute proof that management intentionaly disclosed material non-public information
in an implicit manner.
We posit that the Siebel decision signaled to market participants the regulation’s
ineffectiveness as a tool for policing implicit communication and, in this study, we examine its
Figures 1 and 2 present Siebel’s stock price reaction and trading volume around the date of the private meetings.
Also, note that Siebel System, Inc. was charged by the SEC twice, first in 2002 and then again in 2004.
5

Siebel at 704.
Disclosure regulations under the U.S. federal securities laws and Reg FD define information as material if “there is
a substantial likelihood that the information would have been viewed by a reasonable investor as having significantly
altered the total mix of information made available” based on the U.S. case laws, TSC Industries v. Northway Inc.
(1976) and Basic, Inc. v. Levinson (1988).
6
7
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effect on the behavior of capital market participants. In other words, did corporate officials view
Siebel as limiting the enforcement scope of Reg FD and modify their disclosure behavior
accordingly? We note that the market may have viewed the decision as aberrational or unlikely to
cause the SEC to change its approach in enforcing Reg FD with the hope that in the future courts
would support the SEC’s approach. 8 Thus, the effect of the Siebel decision on subsequent
managers’ behavior is an empirical question. A significant increase in selective disclosure after
the court’s ruling would suggest that the market viewed the decision as a significant impediment
to the SEC’s enforcement policy going forward. The finding would also suggest that challenges
associated with enforcing corporate disclosure regulations in the context of implicit
communication can significantly limit the effectiveness of such regulations.
We examine the change in managers’ selective disclosure behavior following the Siebel
Systems decision by investigating the change in selective disclosure to financial analysts, given
that managers’ use of implicit communication to convey non-public information privately to
analysts was one of the stated concerns of the SEC (see, e.g., SEC 1999a, 2000). We follow
Gintschel and Markov’s (2004) approach and examine changes in the information content of
analyst information outputs after the court’s ruling. We use a sample of analyst earnings forecasts
and stock recommendations issued from September 1, 2004, to August 31, 2006, the two-year
period around the court’s ruling. We find that the effect on stock returns due to analyst information
outputs (earnings forecasts and stock recommendations) is significantly greater in the one-year
period after the court’s ruling than that in the one-year period before the court’s ruling, 7.6% versus
5.3% absolute standardized stock returns. This result suggests that the court’s ruling led to a
statistically and economically significant increase in firms’ selective disclosure to analysts.
To mitigate the concern that the above results are due to an unspecified time trend, we
perform a pseudo-event test (e.g., Kross and Suk 2012). We divide the sample period into three
For example, Sherman and Sterling LLP noted in its Client Publication: “It remains to be seen whether the SEC will
appeal the court’s decision and whether other courts will agree with what is essentially non-binding dicta in the court’s
opinion that the close scrutiny brought to bear by the SEC finds no support in the regulation and will have the effect
of impeding the broad flow of information to the public (Sherman and Sterling LLP, 2005, page 3).”
8

4
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overlapping one-year sub-periods (Sept. 1, 2004 – Aug. 31, 2005; Mar. 1, 2005 – Feb. 28, 2006;
and Sept. 1, 2005 – Aug. 31, 2006), and use March 1, 2005 and March 1, 2006 as pseudo-event
dates for the first and third sub-period, respectively. For the pseudo-event dates, we do not observe
a significant change in the information content of analyst information outputs. However, using the
actual date of the court’s ruling, September 1, 2005, as the event date for the second sub-period,
we find results similar to those observed for the full sample. This analysis helps us rule out the
time trend explanation for our main results.
To further mitigate the concern that our findings may be due to some other macro events
during our two-year sample period, we examine changes in the information content of analyst
information outputs over a much shorter sample period, specifically, two months around the
court’s ruling. We find consistent results, showing a significant increase in the information content
of analyst information outputs after the court’s ruling. This analysis further suggests that our main
finding is likely to be driven by the court’s ruling.
Next, we carry out a cross-sectional analysis for further identification of the reason behind
our findings. Prior studies have shown that managers discriminate among analysts by granting
better private information access to analysts who hold a more favorable view of their firm (e.g.,
Gintschel and Markov 2004; Chen and Matsumoto 2006). If the increase in the information content
of analyst information outputs after the court’s ruling is indeed due to an increase in managers’
selective disclosure to the analysts, then this increase should be more pronounced if an analyst
tends to hold a more favorable view of the firm. We show that, after the court’s ruling, the increase
in the information content of analyst information outputs related to a firm is more pronounced for
those analysts who tend to hold a more favorable view of the firm. Thus, this result further suggests
that the increase in the information content of analyst information outputs after the court’s ruling
is likely to be driven by the increase in selective disclosure by managers to analysts.
Additionally, we use an alternative methodology to examine the effect of the court’s ruling
on firms’ selective disclosure to analysts. We follow Mohanram and Sunder’s (2006) approach,
5
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which is based on the notion that an increase in selective disclosure from managers to analysts
would reduce the analyst’s workload per firm. They measure analyst workload using the average
number of firms covered by an analyst as well as the average number of analysts following a firm.
We find a significant increase in the average number of firms covered by an analyst and the average
number of analysts following a firm in the one-year period after the court’s ruling relative to the
one-year period before the ruling, and these effects are of similar order of magnitude as those
documented by Mohanram and Sunder (2006). These results further suggest that analyst access to
selective disclosure increased after the court’s ruling.
We note that the scope of our analysis is limited by the fact that the very nature of private
meetings prevents us from directly documenting the nature of the information that was conveyed.9
Even though we cannot provide direct evidence, our setting offers a unique opportunity to
empirically examine the challenge of implicit communication to the effectiveness of enforcing
corporate disclosure regulation. 10 We infer that our results are due to officials’ increasing use of
implicit communication in private meetings for the following reasons. First, both explicit and
implicit communication made through public disclosures subject corporate officials to potential
liability under Rule 10b-5. This liability can be enforced by private litigants through class actions
in addition to SEC enforcement actions. Indeed, studies have found that corporate officials’ use of
optimistic tone in public disclosures can subject them to increased litigation risk (Rogers, Van
Buskirk, and Zechman 2011; Cazier, Merkley, and Treu 2019). In contrast, corporate officials are
9

Currently, companies are not required to disclose publicly the discussions in their private meetings with analysts or
investors (Soltes 2018). Soltes (2014), Solomon and Soltes (2015), and Park and Soltes (2018) overcome this data
limitation to some extent by obtaining proprietary records of private meetings from one or two companies. They are
able to address several interesting questions with that data. However, due to potential legal concerns with possessing
records of management’s responses, they could not obtain permission to analyze information that was disclosed by
management (cf. Park and Soltes, 2018).
10
We note that prior studies on the effect of Reg FD also rely on indirect evidence. Studies that address whether Reg
FD reduced private disclosure by firms of non-public information to analysts arrive at their conclusions by examining
the change in the properties of analysts’ forecasts and analysts’ workload (Gintschel and Markov 2004; Mohanram
and Sunder 2006; Kross and Suk 2012;). Studies that address the existence of private disclosures of non-public
information under Reg FD by firms to analysts, also rely on indirect evidence. For example, Green, Jame, Markov,
and Subasi (2014) examine whether access to management at broker-hosted investor conferences is associated with
more informative research output by analysts.

6
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unlikely to be subject to 10b-5 liability for statements made privately both because such disclosures
are made to a limited audience, rendering them unsuitable for a class action lawsuit, and because
a private claim would require proof by the plaintiffs that the private disclosures materially altered
the total mix of information available, proof that would implicitly concede that the plaintiffs had
received material non-public information. 11 Second, the Siebel opinion explicitly instructed
corporate officials that, in evaluating their private disclosures, the courts would be focused on
explicit statements and the extent to which those statements “add, contradict, or significantly alter
the material information available to the general public.” Siebel thus allowed officials to infer that
implicit communication would not be subject to a similarly exacting degree of judicial scrutiny. 12
To further examine the likelihood that our results are due to officials’ increasing use of
implicit communication in private meetings, we report survey results from 60 lawyers (primarily
law firm partners with more than 20 years of experience) about their perceptions of the reason for
the effect we document around the court’s ruling. 13 We selected these lawyers based on their
specific expertise in Reg FD. The results show that these lawyers perceive an increase in implicit
communication to be a more likely explanation of the effect than an increase in explicit
communication or any other reason.
A contemporaneous study by Allee, Bushee, Kleppe, and Pierce (2019), concludes that
Siebel decision increased selective disclosure by managers to other market participants,
institutional investors, by showing an increase in informed trading by transient institutional
investors after the decision. Their finding further supports the proposition that our finding of an
increase in the informativeness of analysts output after the Siebel decision is unlikely to be due to
11

If plaintiffs acknowledged receiving material non-public information and trading on that information, they would
face potential liability for illegal insider trading.
12
The change in management perceptions, as suggested by our results, is consistent with the change in the SEC’s
behavior. After the Siebel Systems decision, SEC enforcement actions were confined to cases in which an issuer’s
private statements were explicitly contrary to its public statements. Specifically, SEC brought six such enforcement
actions in the years 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2013 (Bengtzen 2017).
13
We assume that the effect the Siebel decision would have had on the behavior of managers would have been most
likely through the information and advice they receive from their lawyers, who are likely to have paid much closer
attention to Siebel decision than other market participants (Soltes 2018).

7
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some other contemporaneous event. The two studies together suggest that Siebel decision resulted
in an increase in selective disclosure by managers to both analysts and investors.14
Our study makes the following important additional contributions. To the best of our
knowledge, our study is the first to focus on the challenge of implicit communication to the
effectiveness of enforcing a corporate disclosure regulation. The Siebel decision revealed the
inherent difficulty associated with enforcing a disclosure regulation, specifically, Reg FD, when
information can be conveyed through implicit communication. Our empirical and survey findings
together suggest that private communication between management and analysts increased
significantly after the Siebel decision, implying that the market participants believe that after
Siebel the SEC would face greater difficulty enforcing Reg FD in the context of implicit
communication, and that consequently the effectiveness of Reg FD significantly decreased
following the decision. 15
Our findings also have implications for other corporate disclosure regulations such as federal
securities laws that prohibit misrepresentation of material information and trading on insider
information, such as Rule 10b-5. Specifically, managers may mislead investors not merely through
explicit quantitative statements but also through qualitative statements and information conveyed
through their tone and demeanor. Enforcement efforts directed to these actions may face similar
challenges. Notably, although studies document that private plaintiffs tend to file securities fraud
litigation based on optimistic qualitative public disclosures (see, e.g., Rogers et al. 2011; Cazier et

14

Note that prior studies that examine the effects of Reg FD also tend to focus on the effect on just one type of market
participant at a time. The findings of these studies then reinforce each other’s conclusions. For example, to document
the effectiveness of Reg FD, a set of studies examined changes in financial analyst outputs (e.g., Arya, Glover,
Mittendorf, and Narayanamoorthy 2005; Gintschel and Markov 2004; Irani and Karamanou 2003; Mohanram and
Sunder 2006) whereas others investigated changes in equity investor behavior (e.g., Ke, Petroni, and Yu 2008; Li,
Radhakrishnan, Shin, and Zhang 2011; Sinha and Gadarowski 2010).
15
Several recent studies show that private communication with management remains an important source of
information for analysts (see, e.g., Green et al. 2014; Solomon and Soltes 2015; Bushee, Gerakos, and Lee 2018;
Campbell, Twedt, and Whipple 2020). These studies typically use sample periods that are post-2005. The significantly
greater difficulty faced by SEC in enforcing Reg FD on implicit communication after the 2005 Siebel Systems decision
could be an important factor driving the results of these studies.

8
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al. 2019), courts may not find qualitative disclosures material. 16 Corporate officials can further
reduce the prospect of 10b-5 litigation by making optimistic statements in private rather than in
public communication. Unlike Rule 10b-5, Reg FD cannot be enforced by private litigants.
Because after Siebel decision the SEC would find it difficult to bring enforcement action against
company officials making optimistic statements in private meetings, corporations and corporate
officials may be less attentive to the risk of providing misleading information through implicit
communication in such meetings.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses prior studies, describes Reg
FD and the Siebel decision, and presents our empirical predictions. Section 3 and 4 present the
main empirical analyses and additional analyses, respectively. Section 5 summarizes our survey
approach and provides corresponding results. Section 6 concludes.

2. Related studies, Reg FD, Siebel decision, and empirical predictions
2.1 Related studies
Reg FD, which targets the selective disclosure of material information by corporations and
corporate officials, typically in the context of private meetings or phone calls, has been the subject
of extensive empirical study. Initial studies of its effect find that the regulation succeeded in
significantly reducing selective disclosure of non-public information to analysts (see, e.g.,
Gintschel and Markov 2004; Mohanram and Sunder 2006; Wang 2007; Kross and Suk 2012).
More recent studies show that private communication with management remains an important
source of non-public information for analysts (see, e.g., Soltes 2014; Green et al. 2014; Solomon
and Soltes 2015; Bushee et al. 2018; Campbell et al. 2020).
Corporate officials can engage in selective disclosure through implicit communication as
well as explicit quantitative statements. A growing body of literature shows that the use of implicit

16

See, e.g. Hoffman (2006), who describes that such cases are frequently dismissed as un-actionable “puffery.”

9
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communication in public disclosures affects capital market perception about firm value. Feldman
et al. (2010) document that managers’ tone, i.e. the frequency of positive words and negative
words, in MD&A is associated with excess market returns in the short window around SEC filings.
Similarly, Loughran and McDonald (2011) show that the proportion of negative words in 10-K
reports is associated with abnormal returns, abnormal trading volume, and return volatility. Davis,
Piger, and Sedor (2012) document significant positive market response to earnings press releases
containing net positive language, i.e. the difference between the percentage of positive words and
the percentage of negative words. Also, net positive language predicts firms’ future performance.
Mayew and Venkatachalam (2012a) document that even managers’ non-verbal cues convey valuerelevant information. They argue that managers’ vocal dissonance reflects managers’ emotional
state and that managers’ positive and negative emotional states during the question and answer
portion of earnings conference calls are associated with contemporaneous stock returns.
The literature also documents that managers can strategically manipulate market perception
through implicit communication. Davis and Tama-Sweet (2012) document that managers with
stronger incentives to report strategically, e.g., managers who habitually meet or beat analysts’
forecasts, reduce the use of negative language in earnings press releases relative to the use in the
corresponding MD&A. Huang, Teoh, and Zhang (2014) show that the language in earnings press
releases is more positive (or negative) when firms have a stronger incentive to bias investor
perceptions upward (or downward), e.g., at the time of equity offerings and merger and acquisition
(or stock option grants). Notably, implicit communication in public disclosures subject
corporations and corporate officials to potential liability for securities fraud under Rule 10b-5.
Rule 10b-5 is subject to both private enforcement by the SEC and public enforcement through
class action litigation. Rogers et al. (2011) and Cazier et al. (2019) show that firms with more
positive language in earnings announcements are more likely to experience class action lawsuits
when compared to other firms in the same industry. These studies thus document a potential

10
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motivation for corporate officials to make optimistic statements in private rather than public
communication, to avoid the prospect of 10b-5 litigation.
Because these studies do not have access to private communication between managers and
analysts, they cannot evaluate the role of implicit communication in that context. Private meetings
present greater potential for the use of implicit communication in that meeting attendees can better
observe a corporate official’s demeanor, tone and expression. Reg FD was specifically targeted at
private communication between corporate managers and analysts. Interestingly, in its one-year
special study evaluating the effectiveness of Reg FD, the SEC reported evidence indicating that
issuer use of private meetings had declined substantially (SEC 2001). More recent academic
studies document, however, that the use of such private communication continues to be widespread
following the adoption of Reg FD. One recent study, Brown, Call, Clement, and Sharp (2019),
report that 70 percent of firms grant investors private access to corporate officials. Studies also
document that managers use those private meetings to convey subtle yet market-valuable
information (Bengtzen 2017; Bushee et al. 2018; Campbell et al. 2020; Solomon and Soltes 2015).
Our study documents the importance of the Siebel Systems case in enabling the use of such
communication in private meetings to continue.

2.2 Reg FD
2.2.1 Adoption of Reg FD
The SEC adopted Reg FD on August 10, 2000, with the goal of reducing information
asymmetry in the market. The regulation was intended to respond to the Supreme Court’s decision
in SEC. v. Dirks, which held that a research analyst who received material non-public information
from a corporate insider was not liable for insider trading unless the insider’s tip constituted a
breach of his fiduciary duty. The rule was highly controversial. Although many commentators
believed the rule would level the playing field for small investors, others expressed concern that it
would have a chilling effect on the flow of information from issuers to the market (Kobi 2002).
11
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One reason for this concern was uncertainty about the applicable standard of materiality. As
adopted, Reg FD prohibits selective disclosure of material information. The rule did not define
materiality, however; instead it incorporated a fairly vague judicially-promulgated definition that
has been extensively criticized. To assist firm in assessing materiality, the SEC provided detailed
interpretive guidelines, which included identifying seven categories of information that “have a
higher probability of being considered material” (see, e.g., SEC 1999a, 2000; Maco 2000; Walker
2000).
The task of evaluating materiality is complicated by the fact that issuers convey information
through quantitative as well as qualitative statements, through the tone they use as well as the time
they devote to discussing certain topics, and through implicit communication. Since the early years
after the adoption of Reg FD, the SEC was of the view that managers could convey material
information through implicit communication, and this view was reflected in compliance guidance
provided by the SEC and its staff members. For example, Walker (2000) states that “the adopting
release [of Reg FD] makes clear that selective disclosure of earnings information cannot come in
the form of indirect guidance, the meaning of which is apparent though implied.” Thus, issuers
who engaged in private communication with analysts and investors after the adoption of Reg FD
had to determine the extent to which those meetings could be interpreted as conveying material
non-public information.

2.2.2 SEC Enforcement of Reg FD
Following its adoption of Reg FD and prior to the U.S. federal district court’s ruling on SEC
v. Siebel Systems, Inc. on September 1, 2005, the SEC brought six enforcement actions against
firms for selectively disclosing non-public information (Bengtzen 2017). Two of these explicitly
involved implicit forms of communication (Hanley 2003; Fisch 2013). First, in 2002, the SEC
penalized Siebel Systems, Inc. and its CEO for selectively disclosing material non-public
information using optimistic statements. Specifically, the SEC charged that during a public
12
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earnings call on October 17, 2001, the CEO characterized the IT market as “soft” and stated that
“things will be quite tough through the remainder of the year.” At an invitation-only technology
conference on November 5, 2001, however, the CEO stated to nearly 200 attendees that “we are
pretty optimistic about what we’re seeing at this time…we’re seeing a return to normal behavior
in IT buying patterns,” without making a simultaneous public disclosure. The SEC deemed the
selective disclosure to be material by noting that immediately afterwards, certain attendees at the
conference purchased Siebel’s stock or communicated the CEO’s statements to others who
purchased the stock. Moreover, on the day of the conference, the company’s stock price closed
approximately 20% higher than the prior day’s close and the trading volume was more than twice
the average daily volume.17 The SEC’s approach of determining materiality by looking at postdisclosure investor actions is consistent with the standards expressed in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson
(1988) – that information is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor
would consider the information important in making an investment decision (Hanley 2003; SEC
1999b).
Second, in 2003, the SEC penalized Schering-Plough and its CEO for selectively disclosing
negative material non-public information to financial analysts. Specifically, during the week of
September 30, 2002, Schering-Plough’s CEO and senior vice president of investor relations met
privately with analysts and portfolio managers of four investment companies. The SEC charged
that at each of the meetings with the investment companies, “through a combination of spoken
language, tone, emphasis, and demeanor,” Schering-Plough’s CEO disclosed negative material
non-public information regarding the firm’s earnings prospects. Soon after the meetings, analysts
at the investment companies downgraded Schering-Plough’s stock, and portfolio managers at the
companies heavily sold the stock. The price of Schering-Plough’s stock declined over the next
several days by more than 17 percent on approximately four times normal trading volume. Through
See SEC v. Siebel Systems, Inc. (SEC 2002) for more details. The SEC’s complaint and administrative proceeding
are available here: https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-46896.htm;
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr17860.htm .
17
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this enforcement action against Schering-Plough and its officials, the SEC reinforced its view
about the role that various forms of implicit communication can play in a Reg FD violation (Hanley
2003).

2.3 The Siebel Systems Case
In April 2003, Thomas M. Siebel, Siebel’s CEO, made a series of public statements
negatively characterizing the company’s performance in the first quarter of 2003 and its expected
performance in the second quarter of 2003. On April 4, 2003, Siebel Systems warned that firstquarter revenues would fall short of its forecast and attributed the shortfall to deals that did not
close before the end of the quarter, i.e., the “deals that slipped.” During the earnings warning, the
CEO stated that “there is clearly less business activity right now than there was three months ago.”
On April 23, 2003, the company hosted an earnings call to discuss first quarter earnings and
earnings guidance for the second quarter. In discussing the company’s first quarter performance,
the CEO characterized the first quarter as a “tough quarter” and linked the company’s difficulties
to the economy. The CEO further stated that certain deals “didn’t get signed…due to basically
uncertainty and war and disease and everything that’s going on around the world that’s kind of
yucky right now” and that “the economic situation is really very uncertain out there…we are not
in expansive stage of the business cycle yet.”
On April 28, 2003, the CEO made a public speech at a conference sponsored by Deutsche
Bank. In that speech, the CEO reiterated how “tough” the market was and linked the company’s
past and future performance to the general economic conditions. The CEO repeated his negative
assessment of the economy: “With war, with famine, with disease, I mean it’s like the apocalypse
out there.” When asked what the company was witnessing “in terms of activity levels now in April
and the economy,” the CEO responded: “Well I read Business Week on the airplane and I see that
they’ve extrapolated the downward trend in software to now boomerang and it’s all happy days
are here again. We don’t see anything in the market to indicate that that’s true.”
14
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On both April 23 and 28, 2003, the company provided guidance for the second quarter of the
fiscal year 2003. It projected that its software license revenues would be in the range of $120 to
$140 million, which was more than the company’s reported revenues for the first quarter.
However, the company conditioned its estimate on the performance of the overall economy. It said
that if the economy improved, the company’s business would improve, and that, conversely, if the
economy did not improve, then the company’s business would not improve.
On April 30, 2003, two officials at Siebel Systems, Inc., Kenneth A. Goldman, Siebel’s CFO,
and Mark Hanson, a senior executive, attended two private meetings in New York, a one-on-one
meeting with Alliance Capital Management and an invitation-only dinner hosted by Morgan
Stanley. At these private meetings, Goldman made statements that, in the view of the SEC, more
positively characterized the company’s business activity and sales pipeline.
Specifically, during the one-on-one meeting with Alliance Capital Management, the CFO
stated that the company’s business activity levels were “better,” that “new deals” were coming
back into the pipeline, and that the pipeline was now “growing.” At the invitation-only dinner
hosted by Morgan Stanley and stated that the company’s business activity levels were “good” and
“better” and that its sales pipeline was “building.” The CFO’s disclosures were significantly more
positive and upbeat than the company’s public disclosures. Unlike the company’s prior public
disclosures about its prospective performance in the second quarter, CFO’s statements about the
company’s business were not linked to or conditioned upon the performance of the economy. The
attendees at the private meetings reacted either by promptly trading Siebel stock or disseminating
the CFO’s statements to selected investors. Immediately following the CFO’s comments, two
Alliance portfolio managers who attended the meeting placed orders to purchase 114,200 shares
of the company’s stock. Prior to the meeting, the portfolio managers had not held the stock for
approximately 12 months in the funds that they managed. Within 24 hours after the meeting,
Alliance Capital Management’s net position on Siebel stock increased by 222,400 shares. At least
two of the attendees at the Morgan Stanley dinner bought the company’s stock next morning and
15
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Morgan Stanley disseminated the CFO’s positive statements to select investors. For example, a
Morgan Stanley institutional sales trader called a client and said that the Morgan Stanley “analyst’s
take” on the dinner was “the body language was positive…the pipeline is building and expected
to grow,” and characterized the information as “positive data points.” Morgan Stanley also
communicated the CFO’s positive comments by e-mail to hundreds of investors, many of whom
bought Siebel stock on the morning of May 1, 2003. On May 1, the stock price closed roughly 8%
higher than the prior day’s close. Trading volume on May 1 was nearly double the average daily
volume for the preceding 12 months (See Figures 1 and 2).
Following these events, the SEC initiated an enforcement action against Goldman, Hanson
and Siebel Systems, alleging violations of Reg FD. Specifically, the SEC complaint alleged that
Goldman’s private communications were “significantly more positive and upbeat” than the
information the company had previously disclosed publicly. The defendants moved to dismiss,
arguing that the statements made by Goldman in the private meetings were neither material nor
nonpublic. On Sept. 1, 2005, the court granted the motion to dismiss, holding that “the statements
relied upon in the complaint fail to support its conclusory allegation that material information
disclosed by Mr. Goldman in private, had not already been publicly disclosed by Siebel Systems.”
In reaching this conclusion, the Siebel court focused exclusively on the specific statements
made by Goldman in the private meetings. In each case, the court concluded either that the private
statements were not materially different from the company’s public statements or that the
information contained in CFO’s comments could be inferred from quantitative information that
was publicly disclosed during the company’s public announcements.
For example, on April 23 and 28, 2003, the company publicly stated that “the company
projected that its software license revenues would be in the range of $120 to $140 million”, which
was more than the company’s reported revenues for the first quarter. The court argued that these
public statements clearly disclosed that the company was projecting an increase in revenues in the
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second quarter. Thus, the court claimed that based on the information, a reasonable investor would
be aware that the sales pipeline was “growing” and “building.”
The court also argued that the CFO’s private statement that the activity levels were “good”
and “better” was based on information available to the public since the company had publicly
reported that it anticipated a future increase in the company’s performance: the terms “good” and
“better” are merely generalized descriptive labels based on the underlying quantitative information
provided publicly by the company. Hence, the statements regarding the company’s performance
or activity levels being “good” and “better” did not alter the total mix of information already
available to the reasonable investor.
The court also considered the subsequent trading activity by those in attendance at the private
meetings, activity that the SEC argued was evidence that Goldman disclosed new material
information. Although the court acknowledged that “[a] major factor in determining whether
information is material is the importance attached to it by those who were exposed to the
information as may be expressed by their reaction to the information,” it concluded that “The
actions taken by those in attendance at Mr. Goldman's speaking engagements, although a relevant
consideration, do not change the nature or content of Mr. Goldman's statements.”
Significantly, although the court noted in a footnote that corporate officials could violate Reg
FD through “Tacit communications, such as a wink, nod, or a thumbs up or down gesture,” the
court limited its analysis in the case to the specific statements made by Goldman in private. The
court observed that Reg FD does not require that the statements made by corporate officials
privately match their public statements “verbatim”, observing that “To require a more demanding
standard, in the context of Reg FD, could compel companies to discontinue any spontaneous
communications so that the content of any intended communication may be examined by a
lexicologist to ensure that the proposed statement discloses the exact information in the same form
as was publicly disclosed.” Noting that “The SEC has scrutinized, at an extremely heightened
level, every particular word used in the statement, including the tense of verbs and the general
17
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syntax of each sentence,” the court held that “such an approach places an unreasonable burden on
a company’s management and spokespersons to become linguistic experts, or otherwise live in
fear of violating Reg FD.” It therefore granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss.

2.4 Enforcement of Reg FD on implicit communication – The Effect of SEC v. Siebel
The Siebel court’s ruling revealed the difficulty of enforcing Reg FD. First, in the context of
private meetings, there is typically no transcript or verbatim record of the information conveyed.
Second, private meetings provide an opportunity for corporate officials to convey information both
explicitly and implicitly through the use of more or less positive language, emphasis and nonverbal cues. Third, Siebel conveyed to market participants the message that, even a significant
stock price reaction or trading activity by select investors following a private meeting would not
constitute proof that those investors had received material non-public information.
Further, Siebel was a high-profile decision. It was the first litigated case involving the SEC’s
enforcement of Reg FD. As a result, the court case generated national attention even in its
preliminary stages (Page and Yang 2005). The Chamber of Commerce of the United States filed
an amicus brief in support of the Siebel System Inc.’s motion to dismiss the civil lawsuit brought
by the SEC.18 At the same time, a group of 24 securities law professors also filed amicus briefs in
opposition to the motion to dismiss. Moreover, the U.S. federal district court’s ruling on SEC v.
Siebel Systems, Inc. (2005) was the first judicial opinion on SEC’s enforcement actions under Reg
FD and the court’s decision was promptly and widely publicized by major news media outlets.19
Thus, the managers of U.S. firms would have quickly become aware of the ruling and its
significance.
Siebel’s effect on selective disclosure by corporate officials depended on the following
factors. The market may have viewed the court’s ruling as likely to make it more difficult for the
18

Available here: http://www.uschamber.com/nclc/caselist/briefsrtoz.htm. The Chamber and others argued that Reg
FD was an unconstitutional restriction of free speech. See Norris (2005).
19
Wall Street Journal (Solomon 2005), the New York Times (Labaton 2005), the Washington Post (Johnson 2005),
and the Financial Times (Parker 2005) featured the ruling the next day.
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SEC to bring enforcement actions in connection with implicit communication made through
private meetings. Alternatively, the market may have viewed the decision as aberrational or
unlikely to cause the SEC to change its approach in enforcing Reg FD. That is, the market may
have expected the SEC to continue to enforce the regulation aggressively with the hope that in the
future, courts would support the SEC’s approach (Sherman and Sterling LLP 2005).
The above discussion suggests that the net effect of the court’s ruling on selective disclosure
by firms is an empirical question. If we find a significant increase in selective disclosure after the
court’s ruling, it would suggest that the market believed that the arguments put forward by the
court were persuasive, and that the SEC would be unlikely to challenge the ruling successfully in
the future. Such a finding would also suggest that the challenges associated with enforcing
corporate disclosure regulations on implicit communication can significantly limit the
effectiveness of the regulations.

3. Empirical analyses
3.1 Research design
To address the effect on U.S. firms’ selective disclosure behavior due to the Siebel Systems
decision, we examine changes in the flow of non-public information from managers to analysts,
by following an approach that is similar to Gintschel and Markov (2004). Their study examines
whether the flow of private information from managers to analysts decreases following the passage
of Reg FD by estimating the change in the incremental absolute stock returns around analyst
information outputs. As in Gintschel and Markov (2004), we consider the following two-step
process:
|RETURN|i,t = αt + βt ANALY_OUTi,t + ε

(1)

αt = a1 + a2 POST_RULINGt + e

(2)

βt = b1 + b2 POST_RULINGt + e

(3)
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where Equation (1) is a cross-sectional regression. It is run separately for each trading day in our
two-year sample period. The dependent variable |RETURN|i,t is absolute standardized stock
returns for firm i on date t. To control for cross-sectional variation in the stock price volatility
across different firms, each individual firm’s time-series daily stock returns are standardized to a
mean of zero and a standard deviation of one over the sample period. ANALY_OUT i,t equals to
one for firm i on date t if at least one analyst earnings forecast or one stock recommendation exists
for the firm around date t. If an analyst information output is announced within two calendar days
following the firms’ public disclosures such as earnings announcements or management earnings
forecasts, then these days are excluded from the definition of ANALY_OUT i,t, because it is not
possible to determine the incremental effect of each of the events on stock returns (Gintschel and
Markov 2004).
To determine the window for measuring the information content of analyst information
outputs, Gintschel and Markov (2004) examine stock market reactions on each of -10 to +5 days
around analyst information outputs for their two-year sample period around the implementation of
Reg FD in 2000. They find that absolute standardized stock returns are significantly positive for
each of the -5, -4, -3, -2, -1, 0, and +1 days around analyst information output. Accordingly, they
use [-5, +1] days window around each analyst information output to measure the information
content of analyst information outputs. We carry out a similar analysis for the two-year sample
period around the U.S. federal district court’s ruling on SEC v. Siebel Systems, Inc. (2005) on
September 1, 2005. We find that the absolute standardized stock market reactions are significantly
positive for each of the days -1, 0, and +1 around analyst information outputs. Thus, we use [-1,
+1] days window around analyst information outputs to examine the change in the information
content of analyst information outputs.20
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The three-day window has been commonly used in the literature (e.g., Francis and Soffer 1997; Lin and McNichols
1998; and Park and Stice 2000). In any case, we show that our results are robust to using the [-5, +1] window.
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In Equation (1), αt captures absolute standardized stock returns for firm-date observations
without analyst information outputs. βt captures the incremental absolute standardized stock
returns due to analyst information outputs. We regress 505 daily estimates of αt and βt on
POST_RULING (Equation (2) and Equation (3), respectively). POST_RULING equals one if a
trading day is after the U.S. federal district court’s ruling on SEC v. Siebel Systems, Inc. (2005) on
September 1, 2005, and zero otherwise. Thus, the estimated coefficient on POST_RULING in
Equation (2), i.e. a2, captures the average change in the absolute standardized stock returns for
days without analyst information outputs. The estimated intercept in Equation (3), i.e. b1, captures
the incremental absolute standardized stock returns due to analyst information outputs in the oneyear period before the court’s ruling. The estimated coefficient on POST_RULING in Equation
(3), i.e. b2, captures the average change in the incremental absolute standardized stock returns due
to analyst information outputs following the court’s ruling. If the flow of private information from
managers to analysts increases after the court’s ruling, then we expect the estimated coefficient on
POST_RULING in Equation (3) to be positive. 21

3.2 Data and sample
Table 1 reports the sample selection procedure and descriptive statistics. The sample includes
stocks issued by U.S. firms with analyst earnings forecasts and stock recommendations available
from September 1, 2004, to August 31, 2006, in International Brokers’ Estimate System (IBES).
Following Gintschel and Markov (2004), we require each stock to have at least one analyst
earnings forecast and at least one stock recommendation in each of the one-year periods before
and after the court’s ruling on September 1, 2005. We also require each stock to have a complete
series of stock returns over the sample period, which includes 505 trading days, available in CRSP.
We exclude stocks with missing data in Compustat for net sales, total assets, and market

21

We repeat the analysis by combining Equation (1) and (2) into a single model using an interaction term and the
results are similar.
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capitalization, for the fiscal year 2003. Our final sample contains 3,172 stocks and 1,601,860 (=
3,172 stocks x 505 trading days) daily stock returns observations. The mean (median) of absolute
standardized stock returns, |RETURN|, is 0.707 (0.525). The mean value of ANALY_OUT is
0.208 suggesting that 20.8% of the 1,601,860 firm-date observations in our final sample have at
least one analyst earnings forecast or one stock recommendation within [-1, +1] days.

3.3 Main results
Table 2 reports results for the test of changes in the information content of analyst outputs
after the court’s ruling. Panel A reports a change around the court’s ruling in the absolute
standardized stock returns for firm-date observations without analyst information outputs. The
estimated coefficient on POST_RULING is 0.018 (t-statistic = 1.37), indicating an insignificant
change. Panel B reports a change due to the court’s ruling in the incremental absolute standardized
stock returns for firm-date observations with analyst information outputs within [-1, +1] days. The
estimated intercept is 0.053 (t=statistic = 12.53) suggesting that the absolute standardized stock
returns are significantly greater on days with than without analyst information outputs in the period
prior to the court ruling. The estimated coefficient on POST_RULING is 0.023 (t-statistic =
3.80).It suggests that the stock market reaction to analyst information outputs increases to 0.076
(= 0.053 + 0.023) aboslute standardized stock returns following the court ruling. These results
suggest that the information content of analyst information outputs increased significantly after
the court’s ruling on SEC v. Siebel Systems, Inc. (2005). This finding is consistent with managers
significantly increasing selective disclosure to analysts after the court’s ruling. This change in
managers’ disclosure behavior implies that the ruling revised market participants’ belief about the
difficulty the SEC would face in the future enforcing the corporate disclosure regulation on implicit
communication.
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3.4 Pseudo-event tests
To mitigate the concern that our results may be driven by a time trend, we perform a pseudoevent test. We divide our two-year sample period into three partially-overlapping one-year subperiods: i) the first sub-period is from September 1, 2004 to August 31, 2005, and is entirely before
the court’s ruling; ii) the second sub-period straddles the court’s ruling, and is from March 1, 2005
to February 28, 2006; and iii) the third sub-period is from September 1, 2005 to August 31, 2006,
and is entirely after the court’s ruling.
Table 3, column 2, reports results for the second sub-period, using the actual date of the
court’s ruling, i.e. September 1, 2005, as the event date. We find results that are similar to that of
the full sample. In Panel A, the estimated coefficient on POST_RULING is 0.001 (t-statistic =
0.06), indicating an insignificant change in the absolute standardized stock returns for firm-date
observations without analyst information outputs. In Panel B, the estimated coefficient on
POST_RULING is 0.024 (t-statistic = 2.86), suggesting a significant increase in the information
content of analyst information outputs from the six-month period before to the six-month period
after the court’s ruling. Columns 1 and 3 of Table 3 report results for the first and third sub-periods,
using March 1, 2005, and March 1, 2006, as pseudo-event dates, respectively. The results show an
insignificant change in the information content of analyst information outputs from the period
before to the period after the pseudo-event dates. These results suggest that our main findings are
unlikely to be driven by a time trend.

3.5 Shorter sample periods
The analysis in Table 2 is based on a two-year sample period, comprising of one year before
and one year after the court’s ruling, and thus it is possible that unspecified macro events during
that two-year sample period may be responsible for our results. To address this concern, we
examine a shorter sample period, specifically, two months around the court’s ruling. Table 4, Panel
A, reports a change after the court’s ruling in the absolute standardized stock returns for
23
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observations without analyst information outputs. The estimated coefficient on POST_RULING
is 0.006 (t-statistic = 0.019), indicating an insignificant change in the absolute standardized stock
returns for firm-date observations without analyst information outputs. Panel B reports a change
in the incremental absolute standardized stock returns for firm-date observations with analyst
information outputs within [-1, +1] days. The estimated coefficient on POST_RULING is 0.080
(t-statistic = 4.37), suggesting that after the court’s ruling, there was a significant increase in the
absolute standardized stock returns due to analyst information outputs. These results mitigate the
concern that some unspecified macro event 22 is responsible for the observed change in the
information content of analyst output after the court’s ruling. 23

3.6 Cross-sectional test
Gintschel and Markov (2004) argue that managers reward financial analysts who hold a more
favorable view of their firms by granting them more access to private information. If the court’s
ruling on SEC v. Siebel Systems, Inc. (2005) made it more difficult for the SEC to enforce Reg FD
on managers’ selective disclosure through implicit communication, then more favorable analysts
should benefit more from the increase in selective disclosure following the court’s ruling. We
examine whether, after the court’s ruling, the increase in the information content of analyst
information outputs is more pronounced for analysts with a more favorable view of the firm. For
this test, we use the following regression models:
|RETURN|i,t = αt + βt ANALY_OUTi,t + γt FAVORABLEi,t x ANALY_OUTi,t + ε
αt = a1 + a2 POST_RULINGt + e

(4)
(5)

The New York Times provides a news archive that covers the two-month period around the court’s ruling:
https://query.nytimes.com/search/sitesearch/#/*/from20050801to20050930/allresults/90/allauthors/oldest/Business/.
We searched business news articles published in the New York Times during the two-month period around the court’s
ruling. We reviewed 1,677 articles, one of which is Labaton (2005), which features the court’s ruling. We did not find
any other event that can alternatively explain the change in the information content of analyst information outputs.
23
We note that the information environment for research analysts was affected by the Research Analyst scandal and
the subsequent Global Research Settlement (Fisch 2007). The scandal was initially revealed to the public through a
press release by the NY State Attorney General in April 2002. The Global Research Settlement received court approval
on Oct. 31, 2003. See https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18438.htm. Because the Settlement predates the start
of our sample period, September 1, 2004, to August 31, 2006, by almost a year, the effect that we observe is more
plausibly attributed to the Siebel decision, which occurred in the middle of our sample period.
22
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βt = b1 + b2 POST_RULINGt + e

(6)

γt = c1 + c2 POST_RULINGt + e

(7)

where FAVORABLEi,t equals one for firm i on date t if at least one earnings forecast or one stock
recommendation issued by an analyst affiliated with a favorable brokerage firm, falls within [-1,
+1] days around date t. A brokerage firm is defined as favorable on a firm-date if the average of
analyst earnings forecasts or stock recommendations issued by the brokerage firm during the past
six months is above the median of all brokerage firms that follow the firm. Equation (4) is
estimated separately for each of the 505 trading days in our sample period. The coefficient βt
captures the incremental absolute stock returns due to analyst information outputs, and the
coefficient γt captures the additional effect for analysts belonging to a favorable brokerage firm.
In Equations (5), (6), and (7), 505 estimates of αt, βt, and γt from Equation (4) are regressed on the
variable POST_RULING, which equals one if the trading day is after the court’s ruling on
September 1, 2005, and zero otherwise. The coefficient on POST_RULING in Equation (5)
captures the change following the court’s ruling in the absolute standardized stock returns for firmdates without analyst information outputs. The coefficient on POST_RULING in Equation (6)
captures the change following the court’s ruling in the incremental absolute standardized stock
returns due to analyst information outputs issued by non-favorable analysts. The coefficient on
POST_RULING in Equation (7) captures the change following the court’s ruling in the additional
incremental absolute standardized stock returns due to analyst information outputs issued by
favorable analysts as compared other analysts.
In Table 5 Panel A, the estimated coefficient on POST_RULING is 0.018 (t-statistic = 1.37),
indicating an insignificant change after the court’s ruling in the absolute standardized stock returns
for firm-date observations without analyst information outputs. Panel B reports a change after the
court’s ruling in the incremental absolute standardized stock returns due to analyst information
outputs issued by non-favorable analysts. The coefficient on POST_RULING is 0.018 (t-statistic
= 3.07), suggesting a significant increase in the information of analyst outputs issued by non25
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favorable analysts. Panel C reports the additional incremental absolute standardized stock returns
due to analyst information outputs issued by favorable analysts as compared non-favorable
analysts. Specifically, the estimated intercept c1, is 0.061 (t-statistic = 12.76), suggesting that the
information content of analyst information outputs is greater for analysts affiliated with favorable
brokerage firms than for analysts affiliated with non-favorable brokerage firms. This result is
consistent with the evidence in the literature that managers discriminate among analysts by
granting more private information access to analysts who hold a more favorable view of their firm
(e.g., Gintschel and Markov 2004; Chen and Matsumoto 2006). Further, the estimated coefficient
on POST_RULING is 0.012 (t-statistic = 1.77), suggesting that after the court’s ruling the increase
in information content of analyst information outputs is greater for analysts from more favorable
brokerage firms than for analysts from other brokerage firms. This finding suggests that more
favorable analysts are bigger beneficiaries of the increase in managers’ selective disclosure
behavior after the court’s ruling.24 This cross-sectional evidence helps further identify that after
the court’s ruling, increase in information content of analyst information outputs is due to an
increase in selective disclosure from managers to analysts.

4. Additional analyses: Analysts’ workload per firm
The preceding analysis uses the Gintschel and Markov (2004) methodology, which is based
on the notion that the increase in managers’ selective disclosure through implicit communication
to analysts would make analysts outputs more informative. We examine the sensitivity of our
resulting conclusions using an alternative methodology. Mohanram and Sunder (2006) argue that
when access to firms’ private information reduces, analysts have to spend greater effort on
gathering and discovering information, and consequently analysts have to significantly decrease
their coverage. To show the effectiveness of Reg FD in curbing selective disclosure by firms to
analysts, Mohanram and Sunder (2006) show that the average number of firms covered by an
24

This distinction becomes more meaningful in light of the Global Research Settlement, which led to more balanced
recommendations (Fisch, 2007).
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analyst and the average number of analysts following a firm decreased significantly after Reg FD.
We follow Mohanram and Sunder’s approach, and to provide evidence for the change in selective
disclosure behavior of firms due to the court’ ruling on SEC v. Siebel Systems, Inc. (2005), we
examine its effect on analysts’ workload, measured as the average number of firms covered by an
analyst and the average number of analysts following a firm.
In Panel A of Table 7, we provide the sample selection procedure for this analysis. We restrict
our sample to analysts that follow at least one U.S. firm in each of the one-year periods before and
after the court’s ruling on September 1, 2005 (Mohanram and Sunder 2006). Our final sample
includes 3,434 analysts. Panel B shows that following the court’s ruling, the average number of
firms covered by an analyst increases by 0.84 (t-statistic = 4.53), from 10.30 firms to 11.14 firms,
suggesting that analysts’ workload per firm decreased after the court’s ruling, presumably due to
an increase in selective disclosure to analysts by managers. In Panel C, we provide the sample
selection procedure for the sample examining a change in the average number of analysts following
a firm, before versus after the court’s ruling. For this analysis, we restrict our sample to U.S. firms
that are followed by at least one analyst in each of the one-year periods before and after the court’s
ruling. Our final sample includes 4,588 firms. Panel D shows that the average number of analysts
following a firm increases by 0.34 (t-statistic = 2.03), from 8.49 analysts to 8.83 analysts. These
results further suggest that analysts’ workload per firm decreased following the court’s ruling,
presumably due to an increase in selective disclosure from managers to analysts. Note that the
effects reported in Table 7 are of similar order of magnitude to that observed by Mohanram and
Sunder (2006) underscoring the economic significance of the effect of the court’s ruling on
managers’ selective disclosure behavior.

5. Survey
One difficulty in our investigation is that private communication between managers and
investors/analysts is unobservable. In order to peer into this black box in relation to our research
27
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questions, we need the perspective of professionals who understand the legal implications of Reg
FD, the Siebel Systems case, and managers’ interactions with investors and analysts. Therefore, to
further investigate the reason for the effect that we document in the previous sections, we survey
lawyers with expertise in Reg FD about the reasons that they perceive to be driving the effect.
These securities lawyers are uniquely positioned to provide this perspective because they
understand the implications of the law and also inform and advise managers in securities law
compliance.

5.1 Participants and survey distribution
We compile a hand-collected database of contact information for securities lawyers with
relevant expertise by searching the internet for law firm memos written about Reg FD and
recording the names and email addresses of the memos’ authors. Our final pool of potential survey
respondents totals 307 lawyers from 74 different law firms.
To distribute the survey, we email out a Qualtrics survey link to potential participants
followed by a reminder email one week later. We open the survey on 6/22/2020 and close it on
7/20/2020. We receive a total of 76 completed responses for a response rate of 24.8 percent, which
is higher than similar surveys of experienced professionals conducted via email such as the survey
of investor relations officers (IROs) by Brown et al. (2019) with a response rate of 14.5 percent
and the survey of chief financial officers (CFOs) by Dichev, Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2013)
with a response rate of 5.4 percent.
Of the 76 completed responses, 16 participants fail one or both initial screening questions
and therefore complete the survey without answering any additional questions. As shown in Table
8 Panels A and B, the 75 percent of participants identify as a law firm partner and 82 percent report
more than 20 years of experience.
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5.2 Survey questions
The survey consists of two screening questions (referenced previously) followed by the main
survey question, which has five parts, and then two questions about participants’ experience
practicing law, which are displayed in Table 8 Panels A and B.25 The two screening questions
allow the lawyers to self-report their (1) Reg FD-related experience and (2) familiarity with the
SEC v. Siebel Systems, Inc. case. Both are yes-no questions and a ‘no’ response to either question
results in the termination of the survey without the opportunity to respond to any additional
questions.
To ensure clear understanding, the survey next differentiates between two sets of terms: (a)
implicit and explicit communication and (b) public and private disclosure settings. Then, after
explaining the existence of the effect we observe in our archival analyses, the question asks
participants to rate the likelihood of five potential explanations (which are shown in random order)
on a 5-pt scale with scale points ranging from 0 = ‘Not at all likely’ to 4 = ‘Extremely likely.’
Figure 3 displays this main research question.
The five explanations that participants rate in the main survey question are different possible
explanations for the results we observe in our archival analyses in sections 3 and 4 of this paper.
The effect could be occurring because managers engaged in more explicit or more implicit
communication post-Siebel and managers might be doing this intentionally or unintentionally. Or,
the results could be driven by another reason entirely. Each of these possible explanations is shown
in Figure 3.

5.3 Survey results
Table 8 Panel C displays the results to the main survey question. Survey participants’
responses indicate the most likely explanation for the effect is that managers unintentionally
increased implicit communication in private meetings with analysts after the SEC v. Siebel
25

We received and incorporated feedback from three law firm partners before administering the survey.
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Systems, Inc. (2005) court case ruling. This explanation is rated by the lawyers as significantly
more likely than any other explanation. Further, both types (unintentional and intentional) of
increases in implicit communication are rated as significantly more likely than increases in either
type (intentional or unintentional) of explicit communication. These results, from highly
experienced professionals uniquely qualified to weigh in on the subject, support the conclusion
that managers’ increases in implicit communication are most likely responsible for the increases
in information content of analyst reports post-Siebel.
The survey results further suggest that the lawyers consider an increase in unintentional
implicit communication to be a significantly more likely explanation than an increase in intentional
implicit communication for the effect. This finding is consistent with the notion that managers may
not intend to violate Reg FD in private meetings, but that, after the Siebel decision, they may have
become less concerned about the possibility of communicating non-public information through
implicit communication, since the court ruled that SEC’s approach of monitoring implicit
communication places an “unreasonable burden” on managers. 26 Our survey results also suggest
that the lawyers did not rule out an increase in intentional implicit communication as a possible
explanation for the increase in information content of analyst reports post-Siebel. This finding is
consistent with the notion that the court ruling may have also signaled to the market participants
that circumstantial evidence such as a significant stock price reaction or trading activity by select
investors following a private meeting may not be sufficient proof that management intentionaly
disclosed material non-public information. Thus, the ruling could also have increased managers’
incentives to take chances and intentionally make selective disclosures through their tone or body
language, if they perceive potential benefits from doing so, such as better relations with important
analysts and less price volaitlity (Allee et al. 2019).

26

This explanation was also echoed in our interviews of three securities lawyers who have expertise in Reg FD.
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6. Conclusion
This study examines the effectiveness of enforcing a corporate disclosure regulation when
information is communicated in an implicit as well as explicit manner. In a unique federal court
case, SEC v. Siebel Systems, Inc. (2005), the court took a literal approach in determining when a
corporate official engaged in selective disclosure and thereby violated Reg FD. The court focused
on a close reading of the text of the official’s statements rather than the official’s tone and
demeanor to conclude that his private disclosures were equivalent in substance to the information
publicly disclosed by the company. We posit that the market viewed the Siebel decision as a signal
that the SEC could not effectively enforce Reg FD against corporate officials who privately
communicated information through positive or negative language, tone, and non-verbal cues. As
a result, the Siebel decision opened the door for officials to convey information selectively through
implicit communication. Using a variety of tests, we provide evidence consistent with conclusion
that the court’s ruling led to a statistically and economically significant increase in managers’
selective disclosure to financial analysts. Our results from the survey of lawyers suggest that the
most likely explanation for the effect of the Siebel decision is increase in managers’ implicit
communication. By documenting the effect of the Siebel decision on the behavior of market
participants and on the effectiveness of the disclosure regulation, our study sheds light on the
challenges associated with regulatory enforcement of a disclosure regulation, when information is
conveyed in an implicit manner.
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Appendix: Variable definitions
Variable

Definition

|RETURN|

Absolute standardized stock returns. Each individual firm’s time-series
daily stock returns are standardized to a mean of zero and a standard
deviation of one over the sample period to control for cross-sectional
variation in the stock price volatility across different firms (Gintschel
and Markov, 2004).

ANALY_OUT

Indicator variable that equals one if a trading day is within [-1, +1] days
around at least one analyst earnings forecast or one stock
recommendation, and zero otherwise.

POST_RULING

Indicator variable that equals to one if a trading day is after the U.S.
federal district court’s ruling on SEC v. Siebel Systems, Inc (2005) on
September 1, 2005, and zero otherwise.
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Figure 1
Siebel’s stock price movements around private meetings on April 30
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Figure 2
Siebel’s trading volume movements around private meetings on April 30
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Figure 3
Main survey question
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Table 1
Sample selection and summary statistics
Panel A: Sample selection
Filter

Number of Obs.

Data Source

U.S. stocks with at least one stock recommendation or
analyst earnings forecast from 9/1/2004 to 8/31/2005
and from 9/1/2005 to 8/31/2006, the one-year period
before and the one-year period after the court’s ruling
on 9/1/2005, respectively.

3,910

IBES

Stocks with complete stock return series during the
sample period from 9/1/2004 to 8/31/2006 (505 trading
days).

3,358

CRSP

Stocks with non-missing and non-negative sales, assets,
and market capitalization at the beginning of the fiscal
year 2004.

3,172

Compustat

The final sample includes 1,601,860 observations: 3,172 stocks x 505 trading days

Panel B: Summary statistics
N

Mean

25th
percentile

Median

75th
percentile

Std. dev.

|RETURN|

1,601,860

0.707

0.232

0.525

0.968

0.706

ANALY_OUT

1,601,860

0.208

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.406

505

0.499

0.000

0.000

1.000

0.500

POST_RULING

Panel A reports the sample selection procedure. The sample period is from September 1, 2004, to August 31,
2006, the two-year period around the U.S. federal district court’s ruling on SEC v. Siebel Systems, Inc (2005)
on September 1, 2005. Panel B reports summary statistics. Variable definitions are in the Appendix.
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Table 2
Effect of the court’s ruling on the information content of analyst information outputs
|RETURN|i,t = αt + βt ANALY_OUTi,t + εi,t

(1)

αt = a1 + a2 POST_RULINGt + e

(2)

βt = b1 + b2 POST_RULINGt + e

(3)

Panel A: Absolute returns on days without analyst information outputs
Dependent Variable: αt

Coefficient

t-statistic

a1: Before the court’s ruling

0.684***

73.17

a2: Change following the court’s ruling

0.018***

1.37

Adj-R2

0.0017

Number of observations

505

Panel B: Incremental absolute returns due to analyst information outputs
Dependent Variable: βt

Coefficient

t-statistic

b1: Before the court’s ruling

0.053***

12.53

b2: Change following the court’s ruling

0.023***

3.80

Adj-R2

0.0260

Number of Observations

505

This table reports changes in the information content of analyst information outputs following the U.S. federal
district court’s ruling on SEC v. Siebel Systems, Inc. (2005) on September 1, 2005. In Equation (1), the
dependent variable |RETURN|i,t is absolute standardized stock returns for firm i on date t. To control for
cross-sectional variation in the stock price volatility across different firms, each individual firm’s time-series
daily stock returns are standardized to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one over the sample period.
ANALY_OUT is an indicator variable that equals one if a trading day is within [-1,+1] days of at least one
analyst earnings forecast or one stock recommendation, and zero otherwise. The estimated daily intercepts
and coefficients from Equation (1) are regressed on the indicator variable POST_RULING that equals one if
a trading day is after the U.S. federal district court’s ruling on 9/1/2005, and zero otherwise. The coefficient
on POST_RULING in Equation (2), i.e. a2, captures the change after the court’s ruling in absolute
standardized stock returns for days without analyst information outputs. The coefficient on POST_RULING
in Equation (3), i.e. b2, captures the change after the court’s ruling in the information content of analyst
information outputs. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels,
respectively.
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Table 3
Effect of the court’s ruling on the information content of analyst information outputs: Pseudo-event test
Panel A: Absolute returns on days without analyst information outputs
First One-Year Period
9/1/04 – 8/31/05
(1)
Coefficient
a1: Before the court’s ruling
a2: Change following the court’s ruling

t-statistic

Middle One-Year Period
3/1/05 – 2/28/06
(2)
Coefficient

t-statistic

Last One-Year Period
9/1/05 – 8/31/06
(3)
Coefficient

t-statistic

0.691***

60.88

0.679***

56.29

0.680***

45.06

-0.012***

-0.75

0.001***

0.06

0.045***

2.12

Adj-R2

-0.0017

-0.0040

0.0137

253

252

252

First One-Year Period:
9/1/04 – 8/31/05
(1)

Middle One-Year Period:
3/1/05 – 2/28/06
(2)

Last One-Year Period:
9/1/05 – 8/31/06
(3)

Number of Observations
Panel B: Incremental absolute returns due to analyst information outputs

Coefficient

t-statistic

Coefficient

t-statistic

Coefficient

t-statistic

b1: Before the court’s ruling

0.051***

9.19

0.055***

9.23

0.079***

12.13

b2: Change following the court’s ruling

0.004***

0.49

0.024***

2.86

-0.007***

-0.74

2

Adj-R

Number of Observations

-0.0030

0.0278

-0.0018

253

252

252

In this table, we break the full sample period into three overlapping one-year sub-periods: 9/1/2004-8/31/2005, 3/1/2005-2/28/2006, and 9/1/2005-8/31/2006. For
the first (third) sub-period, the pseudo-event date is 3/1/2005 (3/1/2006). For the second sub-period, the event date is 9/1/2005, which is the actual date of the U.S.
federal district court’s ruling on SEC v. Siebel Systems, Inc. (2005). ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
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Table 4
Effect of the court’s ruling on the information content of analyst information outputs: Short
sample period
Panel A: Absolute returns on days without analyst information outputs
Dependent Variable: αt

Coefficient

t-statistic

a1: Before the court’s ruling

0.640***

27.62

a2: Change following the court’s ruling

0.006***

0.19

Adj-R2

-0.0229

Number of Observations

44

Panel B: Incremental absolute returns due to analyst information outputs
Dependent Variable: βt

Coefficient

t-statistic

b1: Before the court’s ruling

0.044***

3.42

b2: Change following the court’s ruling

0.080***

4.37

Adj-R2

0.2957

Number of Observations

44

In this table, we repeat the analysis in Table 2 after replacing the two-year sample period with a two-month
sample period around the U.S. federal district court’s ruling on SEC v. Siebel Systems, Inc. (2005) on
September 1, 2005. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels,
respectively.
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Table 5
Cross-sectional test: Favorable vs. non-favorable analysts
|RETURN|i,t = αt + βt ANALY_OUTi,t + γt ANALY_OUTit x FAVORABLEi,t + ε

(4)

αt = a1 + a2 POST_RULINGt + e

(5)

βt = b1 + b2 POST_RULINGt + e

(6)

γt = c1 + c2 POST_RULINGt + e

(7)

Panel A: Absolute returns on days without analyst information outputs
Dependent Variable: αt
a1: Before the court’s ruling
a2: Change following the court’s ruling
Adj-R2
Number of Observations

Coefficient
0.684***
0.018***

t-statistic
73.17
1.37
0.0017
505

Panel B: Incremental absolute returns due to non-favorable analyst information outputs
Dependent Variable: βt
b1: Before the court’s ruling
b2: Change following the court’s ruling
Adj-R2
Number of Observations

Coefficient
0.029***
0.018***

t-statistic
6.89
3.07
0.0165
505

Panel C: The effect of favorable analysts
Dependent Variable: γt
c1: Before the court’s ruling
c2: Change following the court’s ruling
Adj-R2
Number of Observations

Coefficient
0.061***
0.012***

t-statistic
12.76
1.77
0.0042
505

This table reports the effect of the court’s ruling on SEC v. Siebel Systems, Inc. (2005) on the information
content of information outputs of analysts who are favorable versus non-favorable to the firm. In Equation
(4), the dependent variable |RETURN|i,t is the natural log of absolute standardized stock returns for firm i on
date t. ANALY_OUT is an indicator variable that equals one if a trading day is within [-1,+1] days of at least
one analyst earnings forecast or one stock recommendation, and zero otherwise. FAVORABLE is an
indicator variable that equals to one if a trading day is within [-1,+1] days of at least one analyst earnings
forecast or one stock recommendation issued by an analyst who is affiliated with a more favorable brokerage
firm, and zero otherwise. A brokerage firm is defined as favorable on a firm-date if the average of analyst
earnings forecasts or stock recommendations issued by the brokerage firm during the past 180 days is above
the median of all brokerage firms following the firm. In Equations (5), (6), and (7), 505 observations of αt,
βt, and γt estimates from Equation (4) are regressed on the indicator variable POST_RULING that equals one
if a trading day is following the court’s ruling on 9/1/2005, and zero otherwise. The coefficient on
POST_RULING in Equation (6), i.e. b2, captures the change after the court’s ruling on the incremental
information content of information outputs issued by analysts affiliated with non-favorable brokerage firms.
The coefficient on POST_RULING in Equation (7), i.e. c2, captures the change after the court’s ruling on the
additional incremental information content of analyst information outputs issued by analysts affiliated with
favorable as against non-favorable brokerage firms. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01,
0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
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Table 6
Robustness test: Alternate windows for measuring information content
Panel A: Absolute returns on days without analyst information outputs -- [-5, +1] window
Dependent Variable: αt

Coefficient

t-statistic

a1: Before the court’s ruling

0.690***

73.91

a2: Change following the court’s ruling

0.016***

1.19

Adj-R2

0.0008

Number of Observations

505

Panel B: Incremental absolute returns due to analyst information outputs -- [-5, +1] window
Dependent Variable: βt

Coefficient

t-statistic

b1: Before the court’s ruling

0.016***

3.93

b2: Change following the court’s ruling

0.021***

3.60

Adj-R2

0.0232

Number of Observations

505

Panel C: Absolute returns on days without analyst information outputs -- [0, 0] window
Dependent Variable: αt

Coefficient

t-statistic

a1: Before the court’s ruling

0.685***

73.29

a2: Change following the court’s ruling

0.020***

1.50

Adj-R2

0.0025

Number of Observations

505

Panel D: Incremental absolute returns due to analyst information outputs -- [0, 0] window
Dependent Variable: βt

Coefficient

t-statistic

b1: Before the court’s ruling

0.111***

21.06

b2: Change following the court’s ruling

0.026***

3.49

Adj-R2

0.0217

Number of Observations

505

In this table, we report results using alternate windows for measuring the information content of analyst
information outputs. We repeat the analysis in Table 2 after replacing the [-1, +1] window with [-5, +1] and
[0, 0], respectively. [-5, +1] window is consistent with that in Gintschel and Markov (2004). ***, ** and *
indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
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Table 7
Additional test: Effect of the court’s ruling on analysts’ workload
Panel A: Sample selection for the sample examining the number of firms covered by an analyst
Filter

Number of Obs.

Data Source

Analysts who issued at least one EPS forecast for U.S.
firms from 9/1/2004 to 8/31/2005, the one-year period
prior to the court’s ruling on 9/1/2005.

4,402 Analysts

IBES

Analysts who also issued at least one EPS forecast for
U.S. firms from 9/1/2005 to 8/31/2006, the one-year
period following the court’s ruling on 9/1/2005.

3,434 Analysts

IBES

Panel B: Number of firms covered by an analyst before and after the court’s ruling

Mean

H0: Pre = Post

Pre

Post

10.297

11.135

(t-statistic = 4.53)

Panel C: Sample Selection for the sample examining the number of analysts covering a firm
Filter

Number of Obs.

Data Source

U.S. firms that have at least one EPS forecast available
from 9/1/2004 to 8/31/2005, the one-year period prior
to the court’s ruling on 9/1/2005.

5,084 Firms

IBES

U.S. firms that also have at least one EPS forecast
available firms from 9/1/2005 to 8/31/2006, the oneyear period following to the court’s ruling on 9/1/2005.

4,588 Firms

IBES

Panel D: Number of analysts covering a firm before and after the court’s ruling

Mean

Pre

Post

8.488

8.831

H0: Pre = Post

(t-statistic = 2.03)

This table presents the change in analysts’ workload as reflected by the number of firms covered by an analyst
and the number of analysts covering a firm. Panel A reports the sample selection procedure for the sample
examining the number of firms covered by an analyst. Panel B reports the average number of firms covered
by an analyst in the period before and in the period after the U.S. federal district court’s ruling on SEC v.
Siebel Systems, Inc. (2005). Panel C reports the sample selection procedure for the sample examining the
number of analysts covering a firm. Panel D reports the average number of analysts covering a firm in the
period before and in the period after the court’s ruling. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
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Table 8
Survey results
Panel A: Job titles of survey participants
Percent of
Participants
75.0

Job Title
Partner/Law Firm Partner/Managing Partner
Counsel/Of Counsel/Senior Counsel

11.7

Other/Blank

13.3

Panel B: Survey participants’ years of law practice
Percent of
Participants
81.7

Years of Law Practice
More than 20 years
Between 15 and 20 years

8.3

Between 10 and 15 years

6.7

Between 5 and 10 years

1.7

Less than 5 years

1.7

Panel C: Main survey question results
Average (SD)
likelihood rating
1.4

Significantly greater
than
2-5

(2) Intentional increase in implicit communication

0.9

3-4

(3) Unintentional increase in explicit communication

0.8

4

(4) Intentional increase in explicit communication

0.5

-

(5) Another explanation

0.7

-

Explanation
(1) Unintentional increase in implicit communication

Column 1 reports the average likelihood ratings on 5-pt scales ranging from 0 = “Not at all likely” to 4 =
“Extremely likely” for five explanations of the effect documented in sections 3 and 4 of this paper. Column
2 reports the results of pairwise t-tests testing the null hypothesis that the average likelihood ratings are
equivalent for each set of two explanations. We report the explanations for which a given explanation is
significantly greater than another explanation at the 10% level using the Bonferroni-Holm method to adjust
for multiple comparisons.
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